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The economics workings of the corporate income tax remain controversial. Harberger’s seminal 1962
article viewed the tax as raising the cost of capital used to produce corporate goods. But corporate
goods can be and generally are made by non-corporate firms, suggesting that the corporate tax penalizes
the act of incorporating, not the decision of already incorporated firms to hire capital.
This paper makes this point with a simple, capital-less model featuring entrepreneurs, with risky production
technologies, deciding whether or not to go public. Doing so means selling shares, which is costly
and triggers the firm’s classification as a corporation subject to income taxation. But going public
has an upside. It permits entrepreneurs to diversify their assets. In discouraging incorporation, the
corporate tax taxes business risk-sharing, keeping more entrepreneurs private and, thus, exposed to
more risk. The added risk experienced by these entrepreneurs limits their demands for labor whose
costs must be paid come what may. And less demand for labor spells a lower wage. Thus, the corporate
tax is, as a general rule, borne, in part, by labor. But it is borne primarily by high-skilled entrepreneurs
who decide to remain incorporated despite the attendant tax liability.
While it hurts high-skilled entrepreneurs and low-skilled workers, the corporate tax benefits middle-skilled
entrepreneurs who remain private, but are able, thanks to the tax, to hire labor at a lower cost. The
reduction in labor costs has one other key effect. It induces low-skilled entrepreneurs to set up their
own risky businesses rather than work for others. This represents a second channel through which
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According to Harberger (1962), the corporate income tax raises the cost of using capital to
produce corporate goods and has incidence and e¢ ciency e⁄ects that depend on di⁄erences
in corporate and non-corporate goods￿production technologies.1 Harberger￿ s formulation has
dominated corporate-tax analysis for a half century notwithstanding its disconnect with three
key facts.2 First, virtually all goods are produced by both corporate and non-corporate ￿rms
using the same product-speci￿c methods. Second, the choice of organizational form has long
been a business decision, not a technological imperative. And third, sectors, such as agri-
culture, which Harberger identi￿ed as ￿non-corporate￿based on output shares, have become
substantially more ￿corporate￿over time, while a few ￿sectors,￿including transportation, which
Harberger classi￿ed as ￿corporate,￿have become somewhat less ￿corporate.￿ 3
These observations led Gravelle and Kotliko⁄ (1989) to endogenize the choice of organiza-
tional form. Gravelle and Kotliko⁄ assume that entrepreneurs aren￿ t able to fully exercise their
talents if they are forced to reach joint decisions with other managers who have potentially
di⁄erent objectives.4 Hence, being an entrepreneur limits one￿ s ability to expand management
and, thus, operations. Consequently, only the more able entrepreneurs, who supply plenty of
managerial talent on their own, will choose to operate by themselves. The alternative to running
your own show in your own shop is working less productively in unison with other managers,
but being able to scale up operations by hiring more managers as well as other productive fac-
tors. But doing so comes at a price; it means becoming large and, thereby, becoming identi￿ed
by the government as a ￿corporation,￿which must pay taxes on the use of capital.5
Gordon and Mackie-Mason (1994, 1997) also let ￿rms decide whether to incorporate, but
the motivation is solely tax minimization. In their framework, each ￿rm makes the decision
based on its own tax situation, with the progressivity of individual as well as corporate tax
schedules ensuring that di⁄erent ￿rms will make di⁄erent choices.
A shortcoming of these approaches to endogenizing incorporation is the linkage of corporate
1See Kotliko⁄ and Summers (1987) for a simpli￿ed presentation of the Harberger Model.
2See Auerbach￿ s (2006) review of the corporate tax theory.
3See Gravelle and Kotliko⁄ (1989).
4All ￿rms producing a given good do so with the same production function. But the e⁄ective managerial
input supply of agents is impaired if one needs to coordinate decisions with other managers.
5In Gravelle and Kotliko⁄ (1989) the number of managers also reference the number of owners, and the
IRS references large numbers of shareholders as one of the corporate characteristics that trigger application of
corporate taxation. See Gravelle and Kotliko⁄ for a discussion of the IRS￿ s rather circular de￿nition of what
constitutes a corporation for purposes of corporate tax liability.
1taxation to capital utilization rather than to the act, per se, of incorporating. Also none of these
articles focuses on the main event triggering corporate tax exposure, namely selling certi￿ed
ownership claims to the general public.6 To rectify these shortcomings, we present a very simple
model of corporate income taxation that omits capital entirely. Our model also connects going
corporate with one decision ￿ going public.7 Doing so permits risk averse entrepreneurs to
certify their ￿rms￿technologies and sell their uncertain outputs to the market at a sure price;
i.e., going public lets entrepreneurs fully diversify their idiosyncratic production risk. But this
decision comes, in our model, at a ￿xed cost. This cost proxies for the expenses incurred
in providing audited statements and annual reports, complying with other public disclosure
requirements, and demonstrating to investors that the ￿rm￿ s technology, captured here by the
entrepreneur￿ s otherwise unobservable ability, is as advertised.
The ￿xed cost of going public limits the size of the incorporated sector; only the more able
entrepreneurs (agents with very high levels of entrepreneurial talent) can cover this cost and,
thereby, secure their livelihoods. Agents with low entrepreneurial skill can also avoid business
risk; they simply can work for private or public ￿rms and earn the going wage. Thus the size
of the ￿xed cost of going public and the level of the prevailing wage determine which agents
become entrepreneurs and which entrepreneurs go public.
As we show, the corporate income tax induces excessive risk exposure. It leads some higher
ability entrepreneurs, who would otherwise have gone public, to stay private and, thereby, bear
their idiosyncratic risk. The increased risk facing these ￿rms leads them to demand less labor,
thereby reducing the equilibrium wage. This reduction in the wage, in turn, induces some lower
ability entrepreneurs to switch from working to establishing private companies. Hence, the
corporate tax leads to too much risk taking not only by relatively high-skilled agents, but also
by relatively low-skilled agents.
Incidence, in our model, is measured in terms of the tax￿ s impact on the well being of agents
with di⁄ering levels of entrepreneurial talent. The lowest ability agents continue working after
the tax, but at a lower wage, and are de￿nitely worse o⁄. Agents who switch from working to
going private experience o⁄setting welfare e⁄ects ￿namely more risk exposure, but greater net
business income because of lower labor costs. In contrast, all initial private entrepreneurs are
6The Internal Revenue Service￿ s de￿nition of a corporation is a business entity that has corporate character-
istics. These are limited liability of its owners, the issuance of shares of easily transferable stock, and existence
as a going concern.
7Chen, Miao and Wang (2010) provide a related dynamic model of a ￿rm￿ s life-cycle. They study the question
of how nondiversifable risk a⁄ects entreprenerial investment and ￿nancing decisions.
2better o⁄because their labor costs fall. Public entrepreneurs who choose to unincorporate when
the tax is imposed also end up facing more business risk. But their welfare loss is mitigated
by not having to pay the ￿xed cost of going pubic and by being able to hire labor at a lower
wage. Finally, public entrepreneurs who remain public are forced to pay taxes on their business
income (the return to their abilities), but the pre-tax level of this income rises thanks to the
reduction in labor costs.
Thus, the only group that su⁄ers a welfare loss with no o⁄setting gain is low-ability workers.
These workers can, it would seem, bear a signi￿cant share of the corporate tax burden ￿a tax
that our model￿ s government nominally levies on the business incomes of society￿ s most able
entrepreneurs. This theoretical presumption is con￿rmed by our numerical examples, which
show workers bearing roughly 16 percent of the burden of the corporate income tax, while
corporate entrepreneurs (agents with skills high enough to take their companies public absent
the tax) bear almost all of the rest of the burden of the tax. But the main incidence punchline
of our model is that the corporate income tax falls on very highly skilled entrepreneurs, who
end up bearing the bulk of the corporate income tax. Yes, the wages they end up paying their
workers decline, but not by enough to make up for the tax payments due on their company￿ s
pro￿ts.
The notion that the corporate tax falls partially on labor may sound familiar. Bradford
(1978) and Harberger (1995) argue that countries, which raise their corporate tax, will induce
capital to ￿ ow abroad, making labor in the capital-exporting country relatively abundant and
reducing the equilibrium pre-tax wage. But the framework they use to reach this conclusion
remains Harberger￿ s (1962) with two modi￿cations. First, the non-corporate sector is van-
quished; all goods are produced solely by corporations, leaving entrepreneurs with no choice
over organizational form. Second, Harberger￿ s closed economy is broken into two or more re-
gions (countries), each with its own tax on the use of capital. Because capital is in ￿xed global
supply, it will generally bear the full burden of the average corporate income tax levied across
the country (world). Workers in relatively high-tax regions (countries) will also be hurt, while
those in low-tax regions (countries) will be helped. But workers, in general, will be insulated
from the tax. This conclusion ￿that workers, on the whole, aren￿ t harmed by imposing cor-
porate taxes at the same rate in all regions (countries) ￿does not hold in our model. In our
framework, the tax on corporate income taxes business risk sharing. Entrepreneurs respond
by hiring less labor because hiring labor is risky. It entails taking on a ￿xed obligation that
3you need to pay no matter how well your ￿rm performs. Stated di⁄erently, there are no ex-
plicit or implicit wage contracts making wage payments contingent on the ￿rm￿ s end-of-period
idiosyncratic productivity draw.
In addition to its general implication that workers as a whole will share a non-trivial share of
the burden of the corporate tax, our model also di⁄ers from the previous literature in suggesting
that it is not capital, per se, that is likely to bear the brunt of this tax, but rather highly skilled
entrepreneurs. From the perspective of an open economy, this di⁄erence between incidence
predictions can be substantial. Take the U.S., which is a highly open economy. The existing
literature would suggest that the corporate income tax is borne to a very large extent by U.S.
workers, insofar as the reduction in their pre-tax earnings is likely to be close to the size of the
tax revenues collected. This is not the end of the traditional story with respect to incidence,
since, again, workers in countries to which previous U.S-domiciled capital moves end up with
largely o⁄setting gains in their pre-tax earnings and worldwide capital owners bear the brunt
of the tax. But it is the end of the story in terms of the tax￿ s impact on U.S. workers. In our
model, we ￿nd workers, particularly low skilled one, being made somewhat worse o⁄, but those
who really pay, in terms of lost income, from the corporate tax, are not low-skilled workers, but
very high-skilled entrepreneurs.
Our model builds on Kihlstrom and La⁄ont (1979), who study the decision to become an
entrepreneur given the uncertain return to that enterprise as well as the general equilibrium
that ensures. They assume that agents di⁄er in their degree of risk aversion. More risk averse
agents become workers and less risk averse agents become entrepreneurs. In contrast, we assume
that agents di⁄er in abilities. Low-ability agents become workers. High-ability agents become
entrepreneurs. In addition, unlike Kihlstrom and La⁄ont (1979), we let entrepreneurs take
their ￿rms public at the cost of documenting their productive capacities and being labeled a
￿corporation￿whose income is subject to taxation.
Our model also bears close connection to Chamley￿ s (1983) classic study of entrepreneurship.
In his model, entrepreneur skill types cannot be observed, even at a cost. High ability entrepre-
neurs signal their type by borrowing with unlimited liability, whereas low ability entrepreneurs
borrow with limited liability. Thus, in Chamley￿ s model, as in Gravelle and Kotliko⁄ (1989),
higher ability entrepreneurs choose non-corporate form, whereas lower ability entrepreneurs
organize themselves as corporations. Here, we ￿nd the opposite. Higher ability entrepreneurs
go public because they can a⁄ord the ￿xed costs of doing so and because doing so allows them
4to reduce their business-risk exposure.
2. Modeling the Taxation of Business Risk Sharing
Consider a static economy populated by a continuum of agents with unit mass. The agents
have an identical expected utility function given by
E [u(c) ￿ ￿v (l)]; ￿ > 0;
where c and l represent consumption and labor, respectively. Assume that u0 > 0; u00 < 0;
v0 > 0; v00 > 0; and v (0) = 0: Agents di⁄er in their skills, with each agent￿ s skill level s drawn
from a distribution G(s) over [0;smax], with density g(s):
Each agent can choose to be a) an entrepreneur who establishes a private ￿rm, b) an
entrepreneur who takes her ￿rm public (incorporates), or c) a worker. If the agent establishes
a private ￿rm, she combines her skill and the labor she hires to produce output according to
the production function: F (z;s;l) = zs1￿￿l￿; where ￿ 2 (0;1), and z is a positive random
variable with distribution H: We assume that each entrepreneur￿ s draw of z is idiosyncratic.
Since private ￿rms have no means of insuring against low realizations of z, their owners face
undiversi￿ed business risk.
Entrepreneurs can hire workers at a competitive wage w: As in Kihlstrom and La⁄ont
(1979), we assume that the demands of entrepreneurship preclude additional work by agents
who choose to operate a ￿rm. Thus, if an agent chooses to be an entrepreneur, she receives
uncertain business income F (z;s;l) ￿ wl: Each agent is endowed with A units of income and
limits her wage bill to wl ￿ A: This assumption ensures that workers get paid even if the
entrepreneur experiences a very bad shock z.8
Consumption of an entrepreneur with skill level s is given by
ce = F (z;s;l) ￿ wl + A:
Her labor demand, le
d (s;w), satis￿es
V e (s;w) = max
l
E [u(F (z;s;l) ￿ wl + A)]; (1)
subject to 0 ￿ l ￿ A=w: Here V e (s;w) denotes the indirect utility function of the entrepreneur
with skill level s. Given our assumed preferences and technology, le
d (s;w) is single valued.
8Permitting entrepreneurs to default on their wage payments would introduce risk sharing between ￿rms and
workers, which we preclude for the following reason. Such risk-sharing arrangements would require entrepreneurs
to verify their ability levels at the cost K assumed below; i.e., it would require their going public.
5By going public, entrepreneurs fully diversify their idiosyncratic business risk, producing
F (￿ z;s;l); where z is the mean of z: But going public is costly for two reasons. First, it requires
paying a ￿xed cost K < A. These costs cover monitoring costs, fees paid to investment banks
and lawyers, etc. Second, public ￿rms must pay corporate income taxes at an e⁄ective rate
￿. To focus on the e⁄ect of corporate taxation, we ignore other taxes such as personal income
taxation. Corporate income-tax revenues are used to ￿nance exogenous government spending.
The labor demand, l
p
d (s;w), of an agent with skill s who takes her ￿rm public satis￿es
￿ (s;w) = max
l
F (￿ z;s;l) ￿ wl;
where ￿ (s;w) denotes pre-tax pro￿ts. The public entrepreneur￿ s consumption is given by
cp = (1 ￿ ￿)￿ (s;w) ￿ K + A;
and the public entrepreneur￿ s indirect utility is given by:
V p (s;w) = u((1 ￿ ￿)￿ (s;w) ￿ K + A):
Since our model has no third-party investors, entrepreneurs who go public sell their ￿rms
into the market and buy claims on ￿rms from the market from other entrepreneurs who go
public. An easy way to picture the market is to assume that each entrepreneur with a given
skill level, say, s￿, pools her pro￿t together with the pro￿t of all other entrepreneurs with
the same skill. This ensures that each receives ￿ (s￿;w)(1 ￿ ￿) to spend on consumption in
addition to A; stated di⁄erently, a public ￿rm whose owner has skill level s￿ can sell her ￿rm,
as an ongoing enterprise that bene￿ts from her entrepreneurial skill/leadership/direction, for
￿ (s￿;w)(1 ￿ ￿).
Agents choosing to become workers receive the safe wage w. We assume all workers receive
the same wage in the competitive market, independent of their skills. Their consumption is
cw = wl + A;
and their optimal labor supply, ls (w), satis￿es
V w (w) = max
l
u(wl + A) ￿ ￿v (l);
where V w (w) is an agent￿ s indirect utility from working.
6Consider next an agent￿ s occupation choice. An agent with skill level s chooses to become
an entrepreneur if and only if
V e (s;w) ￿ V w (w):
Agents choosing to become entrepreneurs go public if and only if
V p (s;w) ￿ V e (s;w):
In the next section, we derive conditions supporting two cuto⁄ values, s1 (w) and s2 (w), such
that an agent with skill level s becomes a worker if s 2 [0;s1 (w)], becomes a private entrepreneur
if s 2 [s1 (w);s2 (w)]; and goes public if s 2 [s2 (w);smax]:
In equilibrium, the sum of the labor demands of private and public ￿rms equals the total









d (s;w)g (s)ds = G(s1 (w))ls (w): (2)
3. Existence and Properties of Equilibrium
To show the existence of an equilibrium, we ￿rst establish the existence of the cuto⁄ values
s1 (w) and s2 (w) for a given w:
Lemma 1 If ￿ > 0 is su¢ ciently large and if K and ￿ are su¢ ciently small, there exist unique
cuto⁄ values s1 (w) and s2 (w) such that s1 (w) < s2 (w) and
V e (s1 (w);w) = V w (w); (3)
V e (s2 (w);w) = V p (s2 (w);w): (4)
Proof. By the envelope theorem, we can show that V e (s;w) and V p (s;w) are strictly
increasing in s: In addition, they are continuous functions of s given our assumptions on pref-
erences and technology. When s approaches zero, V e (s;w) and V p (s;w) approach u(A) and
u(A ￿ K); respectively. So V e (0;w) > V p (0;w): Note that V w (w) decreases with ￿: When
￿ is su¢ ciently large, workers choose not to work and V w (w) approaches u(A): Thus, by the
intermediate value theorem, there is a unique value s1 (w) 2 [0;smax] such that (3) holds. When
s > 0,
V e (s;w) = E [u(F (z;s;le
d) ￿ wle
d + A)] < u(F (￿ z;s;le
d) ￿ wle
d + A)
< u(￿ (s;w) + A);
7where le
d denotes the optimal labor demand of the private entrepreneur. The inequality follows
from the concavity of u and the second inequality follows from the de￿nition of ￿ (s;w): It
follows that
V e (s;w) < u((1 ￿ ￿)￿ (s;w) ￿ K + A) = V p (s;w);
for su¢ ciently small K and ￿: Thus, by the intermediate value theorem, there exists a unique
cuto⁄ value s2 (w) 2 (0;smax] such that equation (4) holds. When ￿ is su¢ ciently large, s1 (w)
approaches zero. Thus, we can make s1 (w) < s2 (w):
Figure 1 illustrates Lemma 1. Given Lemma 1 and its proof, an agent with skill level s
works if s 2 [0;s1 (w)], becomes a private entrepreneur if s 2 [s1 (w);s2 (w)]; and goes public
if s 2 [s2 (w);smax]:
Proposition 1 Let the assumptions in Lemma 1 hold. Then there exists an equilibrium.
Proof. Given our assumed preferences and technology, total labor demand and total labor
supply are continuous functions of wage w: In addition, when w is su¢ ciently large, all agents
choose to be workers and total labor supply exceeds total labor demand. When w approaches
zero, all agents choose to be entrepreneurs. Thus, total labor demand exceeds total labor supply.
By the intermediate value theorem, there is a wage rate such that the labor market clears.
Clearly, if the total labor demand curve is downward sloping and the total labor supply curve
is upward sloping, the equilibrium is unique. However, given our assumption on preferences, the
total labor supply curve may not slope upward because of competing income and substitution
e⁄ects. Moreover, it is not trivial to show that the total labor demand curve is downward
sloping; when the wage rate, w, changes, a ￿rm￿ s cuto⁄ values as well as its labor demand
change. It is straightforward to show that l
p
d (s;w) and s1 (w) decrease with w: It is not hard
to show le
d (s;w) decreases with w given certain conditions identi￿ed by Kihlstrom and La⁄ont
(1979). The di¢ culty comes in ensuring monotonicity of s2 (w):









then @s2 (w)=@w > 0:























Figure 1: Determination of the cuto⁄values. This ￿gure plots indirect utility as functions
of the skill level s for a given wage w: The horizontal line represents a worker￿ s indirect utility
function V w (w). The solid curve represents a private entrepreneur￿ s indirect utility V e (s;w).
The dashed curve represents a public entrepreneur￿ s indirect utility V p (s;w).
9Proof. (i) Di⁄erentiating equation (3) yields the desired result.
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As Figure 1 illustrates, the V p (s;w) curve has a larger slope than the V e (s;w) curve at the
cuto⁄ value s2 (w): This implies that the denominator in equation (6) is positive. Given (5),
we obtain @s2 (w)=@w > 0:
The expressions u0 (cp)l
p
d and E [u0 (ce)]le
d represent the decrease in the V p (s;w) and V e (s;w)
curves, respectively, following a decrease in w: If the decrease in V p (s;w) is larger than the
decrease in V e (s;w) in that condition (5) holds, then an increase in w raises s2 (w): Intuitively,
an entrepreneur has less incentives to make his ￿rm public following an increase in the wage,
when this wage increase hurts entrepreneurs in the public ￿rms more than entrepreneurs in the
private ￿rms.
Lemma 3 For s > 0; we have
le
d (s;w) < l
p
d (s;w);
i.e., private entrepreneurs demand less labor at a given skill level than do public entrepreneurs.
Proof. The labor demand le









where the equality holds when le





zs1￿￿l￿ ￿ wl + A
￿
￿zs1￿￿l￿￿1￿
E [u0 (zs1￿￿l￿ ￿ wl + A)]




zs1￿￿l￿ ￿ wl + A
￿
;￿zs1￿￿l￿￿1￿
E [u0 (zs1￿￿l￿ ￿ wl + A)]
< ￿￿ zs1￿￿l￿￿1;
where the last inequality follows from u00 < 0: Because l
p
d (s;w) satis￿es the ￿rst-order condition:
￿￿ zs1￿￿l￿￿1 = w;
we can deduce that le
d (s;w) < l
p
d (s;w):
The following lemma establishes the monotonicity of total labor demand.
10Lemma 4 Let the conditions in Lemma 1 and (5) hold. Suppose le
d (s;w) decreases with w:
Then the total labor demand decreases with the wage rate w:




























Given Lemmas 1-3 and assumptions, the preceding expression is negative.
We are now ready to show that the equilibrium is locally unique.
Proposition 2 Let the conditions in Lemma 4 hold. Suppose equilibrium occurs in the upward
slopping part of the ls (w) curve. Then the equilibrium is unique.
Proof. Proposition 1 gives the existence. For uniqueness, Lemma 4 shows that total labor
demand decreases with w: Lemma 2(i) shows that s1 (w) increases with w: It follows from the
assumption that total labor supply G(s1 (w))ls (w) increases with w: Hence, the equilibrium is
locally unique.
We turn next to comparative statics beginning with the following proposition, which is key
to understanding the tax￿ s incidence.
Proposition 3 Suppose the conditions in Proposition 2 hold. Then an increase in the corporate
tax rate ￿ reduces the equilibrium wage w; i.e., @w=@￿ < 0:


































































11From the proof of Lemma 2, we know that the denominator is positive. Thus, @s2=@￿ > 0:
Using this fact and Lemma 3, we know that the expression on the right-hand side of equation
(7) is positive. Using Lemmas 1-4, we deduce that the expression in the bracket on the left-hand
side of equation (7) is negative. Thus, @w=@￿ < 0:
Figure 1 provides the intuition behind Proposition 3. An increase in the corporate tax rate
￿ reduces corporate pro￿ts, and hence the utility of the owner of the corporate ￿rm. That is,
the V p (s;w) curve shifts down. As a result, entrepreneurs have less incentives to go public so
that s2 goes up. This means there are fewer corporations in the economy. Hence, aggregate
labor demand falls because public ￿rms hire more labor than private ￿rms. The decline in labor
demand leads the equilibrium wage to fall, enabling high ability agents to shift some of the tax
burden onto the least able members of society ￿workers. Note that since there is no capital
in the model, the corporate tax is equivalent to a pure pro￿ts tax, albeit with one important
exception. In taxing business risk sharing, it reduces the incentive to go public and, thereby,
reduces the total demand for labor.
What is the e⁄ect of the corporate tax rate ￿ on the cuto⁄values s1 and s2? By Proposition
3, an increase in ￿ reduces wage w, and the decrease in w reduces s1 by Lemma 2(i). The
reason is that lower skilled agents who were close to the margin in deciding to start their own
￿rms rather than play it safe and work for others, now see private entrepreneurship as more
attractive thanks to the lower wages they￿ ll need to pay their workers.
The e⁄ect of ￿ on s2 is ambiguous. By (4), s2 depends on both w and ￿; the lower wage that
must be paid to labor raises the pro￿ts of all entrepreneurs and makes clearing the ￿xed cost













An increase in ￿ has a positive direct e⁄ect, @s2=@￿ > 0 as shown in the proof of Proposition 3.
It also has an indirect e⁄ect through the general equilibrium wage change, represented by the
￿rst term on the right-hand side of (8). This e⁄ect is negative by Proposition 3 and Lemma
2(ii). We are unable to show analytically which e⁄ect dominates. In our numerical examples
the positive direct e⁄ect typically dominates the negative indirect e⁄ect; so an increase in the
corporate tax rate raises s2; thereby discouraging incorporation (going public).
124. Illustrating the E⁄ects of Corporate Taxation








where ￿ > 0 is the coe¢ cient of constant relative risk aversion and 1=￿ > 0 is the Frisch elasticity
of labor supply. We assume that s is drawn from a Pareto distribution with density ￿s￿￿￿1on
[1;1) and that z is drawn from a lognormal distribution with mean zero and variance ￿2:9 Our
baseline parameter values are: ￿ = 2; ￿ = 1; ￿ = 9; ￿ = 0:6; ￿ = 1:1; ￿ = 0:5; K = 0:05; and
A = 1: We compute and compare pre-tax (￿ = 0) and post-tax (￿ = 0:15) equilibria. At these
equilibria, labor supply is upward slopping.10 In addition, all conditions speci￿ed in Proposition
3 are satis￿ed.
4.1. Pre- and Post-Tax Equilibria
Table 1 presents results for our baseline assumptions and two alternatives.
Table 1 The Impact of Corporate Taxation
Pre-Tax Equilibrium Post-Tax Equilibrium
s1 s2 w s1 s2 w
Baseline 2.52 2.92 2.14 2.38 4.76 2.10
￿ = 2:5 2.61 2.74 2.18 2.46 4.25 2.14
￿ = 0:52 2.56 2.77 2.15 2.41 4.44 2.11
Note: The baseline parameter values are given by ￿ = 2; ￿ = 1; ￿ = 9; ￿ = 0:6; ￿ = 1:1;
￿ = 0:5; K = 0:05; and A = 1:
As advertised, corporate taxation reduces the cuto⁄ value s1, raises the cuto⁄ value s2, and
lowers the wage, w. Consequently, the number of private entrepreneurs expands at both ends
of the skill distribution, with marginal workers encouraged by the lower cost of labor to start
their own businesses and marginal public entrepreneurs driven by the tax to operate privately.
In the pre-tax baseline equilibrium, 63.8 percent of agents are workers, 5.4 percent are private
entrepreneurs, and 30.8 percent are public entrepreneurs. The tax reduces the share of workers
9The Pareto distribution does not satisfy our distributional assumption because its lower support is not zero.
However, our numerical results are consistent with our theoretical predictions presented in Section 3.
10Given our utility function, labor supply curve can bend backward. When A > wl(￿ ￿ 1) labor supply slopes
upward.
13to 61.5 percent, raises the share of private entrepreneurs to 20.5 percent, and reduces the share
of public entrepreneurs to 18.0 percent. Thus, the share of all entrepreneurs (private plus
public) who go public is highly sensitive to the corporate tax rate; it falls from 85.1 percent to
46.7 percent. The share of total employment by public ￿rms falls by less, however ￿from 91.9
percent to 70.8 percent. This re￿ ects the fact that the entrepreneurs remaining public have the
most skill and, therefore, the highest demand for labor. The wage in the baseline case falls by
1.9 percent across the equilibria.
The results for the other parameter values show similar sensitivity of the cuto⁄ values and
private-public split of entrepreneurs to the tax. And their di⁄erences with the baseline results
are intuitive. A higher degree of risk aversion (larger value of ￿) or a higher degree of risk (a
larger value of ￿), makes agents less willing to take risk. Consequently, more low-skilled agents
opt to be workers (s1 is higher) and a higher share of entrepreneurs take their ￿rms public (s2
is lower and closer to s1). Interestingly, the equilibrium wage is higher when ￿ or ￿ are larger;
the higher demand for labor from the public ￿rms outweighs the higher supply.
4.2. Incidence
We turn next to the incidence of the corporate tax. We categorize agents into ￿ve groups
according to their skill levels. Agents in group 1 have the lowest skill levels and are workers
in both the pre- and post-tax equilibria. Group 2 agents work in the pre-tax equilibrium, but
become entrepreneurs in the post-tax equilibrium. Agents in group 3 are entrepreneurs in both
equilibria. Agents in group 4 are entrepreneurs who go public in the pre-tax equilibrium, but
stay private in the post-tax equilibrium. Agents in group 5 have the highest skill levels and go
public in both equilibria.
Consider, ￿rst, marginal incidence, i.e., the incidence from imposing an in￿nitesimal tax
starting at the pre-tax (zero-tax) equilibrium. In this case, the measures of agents in groups 2
and 4 converge to zero. The absolute incidence on those in group 1 (workers) with skill level





where ls (w) is worker￿ s pre-tax labor supply. This expression is positive because dw=d￿ < 0:
Group 1￿ s incidence share is given by
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14where the denominator equals marginal corporate tax revenues. For those at the other end















This expression shows that corporations bear less than 100 percent of the the tax burden with
the degree of tax shifting depending on the extent to which the wage falls.
To compute the incidence on those in group 3 (private entrepreneurs), consider the certainty-
equivalent compensating di⁄erential, x(￿), which satis￿es
Eu(ce (￿) + x(￿)) = Eu(ce (0));
where ce (0) and ce (￿) denote the entrepreneur￿ s consumption in the pre- and post-tax equilib-
ria, respectively. Note that we have assumed that entrepreneurs do not supply labor and thus
do not derive disutility from work. The derivative with respect to ￿ is
E
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As proved above, dw=d￿ < 0; hence, group 3 bene￿ts from the corporate tax. This group￿ s








The labor market-clearing condition and equations (9)-(11) indicate that the marginal inci-
dence shares sum to 1. Table 2 shows these shares for the baseline and other parameterizations.
Its headline ￿nding is that workers bear a signi￿cant fraction ￿roughly 16 percent of the tax
burden. For the baseline parameter values, workers bear 16.8 percent of tax burden, while cor-
porations bear 84.2 percent. Private entrepreneurs bene￿ts from corporate taxation and these
bene￿ts account for 1.0 percent of tax revenues.
15When agents are more risk averse or when there is more risk in running private businesses,
more entrepreneurs go public and are more reluctant to become private in response to the tax.
Hence, there is a smaller decline in the demand for labor and less downward pressure on the
wage. This leaves private and public entrepreneurs bearing a somewhat larger share of the tax
burden.
Table 2. Marginal Tax Incidence
Measured as a Percentage of Tax Revenues
Workers Private Entrepreneurs Public Entrepreneurs
Baseline 16.8 -1.0 84.2
￿ = 2:5 16.5 -0.3 83.8
￿ = 0:52 15.5 -0.5 85.0
Note: The baseline parameter values are given by ￿ = 2; ￿ = 1; ￿ = 9; ￿ = 0:6; ￿ = 1:1;
￿ = 0:5; K = 0:05; and A = 1:
As table 3 makes clear, marginal incidence analysis provides only a rough guide to the ac-
tual incidence of a fully implemented corporate tax. The table shows the incidence shares with
our ￿fteen percent tax fully turned on, with incidence for each group calculated as the addi-
tional income needed in the post-tax equilibrium to restore pre-tax levels of utility. Measuring
incidence based on equivalent variation generates similar results.
Table 3. Incidence of a 15 Percent Corporate Income Tax
Measured as a Percentage of Tax Revenues
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 Total Incidence
Baseline 26.2 0.06 -1.7 16.0 81.8 122.4
￿ = 2:5 24.2 0.04 -0.5 13.2 81.4 118.3
￿ = 0:52 24.7 0.05 -0.8 14.7 81.8 120.4
Note: The baseline parameter values are given by ￿ = 2; ￿ = 1; ￿ = 9; ￿ = 0:6; ￿ = 1:1;
￿ = 0:5; K = 0:05; and A = 1:
According to Table 3, agents in group 5 (high skilled agents who remain public) bear burdens
that collectively total about four ￿fths of tax revenues. Agents in group 4 (entrepreneurs who
would otherwise go public and are of zero measure in table 2) also bear a signi￿cant burden of
16the tax, about 16 percent in the baseline case. Workers in group 1 are also worse o⁄. Their
baseline tax burden is 26.2 percent of tax revenues thanks to the decline in their wage rate.
Agents in group 2 (also of zero measure in table 2) are also worse o⁄. They have the choice of
remaining as workers, but earning a lower wage or becoming private entrepreneurs and earning
more pro￿ts, on average, because labor has become cheaper, but becoming exposed to personal
business risk. These agents opt for taking on the business risk, but, on balance, they are worse
o⁄. Agents in group 3, who are private entrepreneurs both before and after tax, are better o⁄
because they now pay their workers lower wages after tax while experiencing no greater risk.
Their bene￿ts are about 1.7 percent of tax revenues given baseline parameters.
As is readily seen, the incidence results are robust to di⁄erent levels of risk aversion and
entrepreneurial risk. Another immediate point is that the sum of the incidence shares exceeds
100 percent as we￿ d expect. The di⁄erence ￿roughly 20 percent of tax revenues ￿re￿ ects the
excess burden from the corporate income tax.11 The distortions relected here arise solely from
inducing private agents to take on excessive exposure to risk. Again, the tax leads higher
skilled agents, who would otherwise go public and play it safe, to stay private and gamble that
their businesses will be pro￿table. And it induces a set of lower skilled agents, who would
otherwise work for others, to gamble on their own businesses because their former jobs are no
longer paying as well as they did.
5. Conclusion
Almost six decades since the Harberger Model appeared in print, economists are still wrestling
with the economic impact of this levy. Harberger￿ s view of the tax as penalizing the use of
capital by corporate ￿rms retains currency, notwithstanding the di¢ cult of squaring the model￿ s
assumptions with the facts. Neither outputs nor inputs, or, for that matter, technologies are
￿corporate.￿A given good can be produced by non-corporate as well as by corporate ￿rms.
And net business income does not exclusively re￿ ect a return to capital. It also includes a
return to entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial skills.
The real margin of choice a⁄ected by the corporate tax is, in the ￿rst analysis, not how much
capital is hired, but whether entrepreneurs will continue to incorporate as a mean of limiting
their exposure to their businesses￿risk. In our simple model, which features no capital, raising
11Proper measurement of excess burden requires compensating for tax-induced income e⁄ects, which we defer
for future research.
17the corporate tax keeps a subset of entrepreneurs from going public. They respond to their
greater business risk exposure by hiring fewer workers, which means a lower wage and makes
workers bear a share of the corporate tax burden. Most of the tax￿ s burden, however, falls on
entrepreneurs who are su¢ ciently high skilled to continue to be able to a⁄ord going public.
The reduction in labor costs makes middle-skilled entrepreneurs (those who stay private
even absent a tax) better o⁄. It also induces some low-skilled entrepreneurs to switch from
working for others to setting up their own risky ventures.
The fact that moderately high-skilled entrepreneurs are dissuaded from going public and
that moderately low-skilled entrepreneurs are induced to go private provides the answer to the
title￿ s question ￿What Does the Corporate Tax Tax? The answer is that it taxes business risk-
sharing and redistributes from the most and least skilled members of society to those whose
skills lie in between.
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